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Rural and urban households in developing countries face substantial idiosyncratic 
and common risk, resulting in high income variability. Households in risky 
environments have developed sophisticated (ex-ante) risk-management and (ex-post) 
risk-coping strategies, including self-insurance via savings and informal insurance 
mechanisms to do so while formal credit and insurance markets appear to contribute 
only little to reducing income risk and its consequences. Informal credit and 
insurance, however incomplete, helps to cope with risky incomes. Despite these 
strategies, vulnerability remains high, and is reflected in fluctuations in consumption. 
It is clear therefore, that further development of safety nets will be necessary. In this 
paper, we focus on the opportunities available to households to use risk-management 
and risk-coping strategies, and on the constraints on their effectiveness.  
 
Fluctuations in consumption usually imply relatively high levels of transient poverty. 
High income risk may also be a cause of persistent poverty. The failure to cope with 
income risk is not only reflected in household consumption fluctuations but affect 
nutrition, health and education and contribute to inefficient and unequal intra-
household allocations.  
 
Deaton’s model provides a useful description of the advantages of self-insurance. 
Policy conclusions may be limited however. In practice, assets are risky, not safe. The 
covariance of asset values and income due to common shocks makes self-insurance a 
far less useful strategy than it seems. We quantify the consequences of holding risky 
assets that are covariate with incomes, using simulations.  
 
Access to relatively safe and profitable assets, which might be useful for consumption 
smoothing, may also be limited. Lumpiness in assets may be a reason why the poor 
cannot protect themselves easily via assets.  
 
Policies that influence asset market risks could be beneficial to households attempting 
to deal with shocks. Policies could include providing more attractive and diversified 
savings instruments. Microfinance initiatives should put savings for self-insurance on 
the agenda. Macroeconomic stability during income downturns would also allow self-
insurance to function better. 
 
Income smoothing can be achieved by income portfolio adjustments. In practice 
relatively little income smoothing (even via income portfolio adjustments) is achieved 
by poorer households. Income diversification for effective risk-reduction appears 
limited. Observed diversification patterns are often not aimed at reducing risk. 
Households face entry constraints to enter into profitable activities.  
 
Income risk reduction often comes at a cost. Income skewing is likely if less protection 
is offered by investing in assets. The long-term consequences for the asset-poor are 
lower average incomes and a higher income gap relative to asset-rich households.  
  ii 
Observing specialisation does not necessarily imply that the household follows a 
high-risk strategy. Also, entry constraints may limit the diversification that can be 
achieved, leaving only low-return activities free to the poor. Income portfolios must 
be seen in relation to the asset portfolio and other options available: a risky, 
specialised portfolio may mean lower consumption risk than a diversified portfolio, 
depending on the asset position.  Finally, several income-based strategies are only be 
invoked when a crisis looms. These (income)‘coping’ or ‘survival’ strategies are 
especially important when the shock is economy-wide. 
 
There has been increasing interest in the empirical analysis of informal risk-sharing 
and theoretical modelling on the sustainability and consequences of these 
arrangements. Risk-sharing can be viewed as the cross-sectional equivalent of 
consumption smoothing over time. 
 
In the absence of  enforcement problems, the existence of better savings opportunities 
and a public safety net providing transfers when common shocks occur, could 
improve welfare without crowding out the informal insurance arrangement. A 
transfer-based safety net is, however, likely to crowd out private (precautionary) 
savings. 
 
Informal insurance arrangements are likely to have to be self-enforcing, imposing 
sustainability constraints. Circumstances in which risk-sharing arrangements may be 
sustained are, inter alia: a low discount rate of the future, high frequency of 
interactions, situations in which idiosyncratic shocks are more frequent relative to 
other shocks. 
 
Evaluating the effects of alternative coping mechanisms such as savings, or of policy 
interventions such as providing better savings instruments or public safety nets, needs 
to take into account their effect on incentives to sustain the agreement rather than to 
go it alone. It is possible that opportunities for precautionary savings or a public 
safety net would actually be welfare reducing and displace the informal insurance 
arrangement by more than one to one. 
 
Any policy intervention that improves an individual’s position outside a private 
group-based informal risk-sharing arrangement may provide incentives to break 
down the informal arrangement. Targeted interventions that target only some 
members of communities or groups could be particularly counterproductive. Group-
based savings schemes could provide a useful alternative or complement if one is 
concerned about crowding-out. The possibly negative welfare effects can be avoided. 
 
Whether the crowding-out and potential negative welfare effects of interventions on 
informal insurance mechanisms are significant is an empirical question. If common 
shocks are dominant and if groups and communities rather than just individuals are 
targeted, these negative effects are likely to be less significant. 
 
Standard quantitative poverty analysis assumes that consumption is smooth. If 
smoothing is not possible, especially when large negative shocks occur, then 
alternative measures of poverty and vulnerability need to be explored. If inter- iii 
temporal data are available, broader definitions can be used to describe 
vulnerability. Aggregate measures of ‘vulnerability’ can be obtained. 
 
Targeting assistance to the vulnerable population requires specific kinds of 
information. Analysing the characteristics of households experiencing chronic or 
transient poverty, or in general, their consumption fluctuations, can provide this 
information. Panel data are required for this analysis. 
 
If policies are exogenous to the risk management and coping strategies, then 
information on how households handle income risk is irrelevant. However, policies 
may affect household opportunities to cope with risk (e.g. by changing exit options 
from informal insurance). In that case, how households cope with risk is relevant for 
the design of policies, in turn increasing data requirements. 
 
If effective safety nets and other consumption risk-reducing policies require detailed 
knowledge of existing risk-reducing actions by households, then surveys need 
information on physical, human and social capital, on shocks, as well as on 
opportunities in labour, product and asset markets. Panel and cross-section surveys 
could be used to collect relevant information. 
 
The complexity of consumption-risk reducing strategies implies that a simple 
indicator is unlikely to be available. Measures of vulnerability would typically require 
detailed data, including from panels. Some indicators that aim to describe 
vulnerability are typically flawed.   
 
The emphasis on the ability to cope with risk via assets, human capital and informal 
insurance and on the opportunities available, marks a convergence of different 
disciplines, bridging gaps with more qualitative approaches.  iv  1 






•  Rural and urban households in developing countries face substantial idiosyncratic 
and common risk, resulting in high income variability. 
 
High income risk is a part of life in developing countries. Climatic risks, economic 
fluctuations, but also a large number of idiosyncratic shocks make these households 
vulnerable to serious hardship. For example, table 1 gives details on the various 
shocks causing serious hardship to rural households in Ethiopia in the last twenty 
years Not surprisingly for Ethiopia, climatic events are the most common cause of 
shocks, but many households suffer from other common or idiosyncratic shocks 
related to economic policy, labour or livestock.  
 
Table 1  Shocks faced by rural households in Ethiopia 
 
Events causing of hardship        
Percentage of households 
reporting hardship episode in last 
20 years        
Harvest failure (drought, flooding, frost, etc.)  78  
Policy shock (taxation, forced labour, ban on migration, …)        42  
Labour problems (illness or deaths)     40  
Oxen problems (diseases, deaths)  39  
Other livestock (diseases, deaths)      35  
Land problems (villagisation, land reform)       17  
Assets losses (fire, loss)       16  
War             7  
Crime/banditry (theft, violence)       3  
Source: own calculations based on Ethiopian Rural Panel Data Survey (1994-1997) 
    
Many other studies have reported high income variability related to risks of various 
forms. Using the 10-year panel data for one of three ICRISAT villages in India, 
Townsend (1994, p.544) reports high yearly fluctuations yields (in monetary terms) 
per unit of land for the dominant crops. The coefficient of variation for castor was 
found to be 1.01, for paddy 0.70 and for a sorghum/millet/pea intercrop 0.51. Kinsey 
et al. (1998) report a high frequency of harvest failures in a 23-year panel of rural 
households in a resettlement area in Zimbabwe.  Bliss and Stern (1982) provide an 
estimate for Palanpur, India: if the onset of production is delayed by two weeks, then 
yields decline by 20 percent. Morduch (1995) provides other examples. 
                                                 
1 Background Paper for the World Development Report 2000/01. The author is Oxford University. An 
early draft of the parts dealing with informal insurance was presented at the Annual Bank Conference in 
Development Economics in Europe, in Paris in May 1999. E-mail: stefan.dercon@econ.kuleuven.ac.be 
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•  Shocks can be idiosyncratic or common. But other characteristics matter as well 
in causing hardship or exacerbating the effect of shocks to income. The nature of 
the shock has implications for the ability to cope with its consequences. 
  
Income risk is caused by a variety of factors. Typically, common (aggregate, 
economy-wide, covariate) risk is distinguished from individual (idiosyncratic) risk: 
the former affects everybody in a particular community or region; the latter only 
affects a particular individual in this community. In practice, even within well-defined 
rural communities, few risks are purely idiosyncratic or common. Table 2 gives details 
on different events and shocks experienced by households in a 3-period panel data set 
on Ethiopia in a data set.  A large number of different shocks affecting income 
happen; most shocks have a large idiosyncratic part. (In the last column, the table 
gives a measure of the extent to which the shock ‘common’ is to the households in the 
community. The lower the contribution of the village level variance to total variance, 
the more idiosyncratic the shock.)  
 
Table 2  Shocks affecting income 1994-1995 (n=1450, 15 communities) 
 1994a  1994b  1995  village  level 
variance as % 
total variance
* 
village rainfall (% above long-run mean)  0.06  0.12  0.12  100 
rain index (individual, 1 is best)
$  0.57 0.57 0.63  77.0 
non-rain shock index (1 is best), total index
$  0.65 n.a. 0.80  24.2 
non-rain shock : low temperature, frost, storm, etc.
$  0.71 n.a. 0.82  35.4 
non-rain shock: pests and diseases on crops
$  0.59 n.a. 0.77  26.4 
non-rain shock: animal damage, trampling,…
$  0.68 n.a. 0.85  29.1 
non-rain shock: weed damage
$  0.29 n.a. 0.14  13.1 
crop index (best=1, 0 worst)
$  0.33 0.65 0.43  35.1 
Livestock affected by animal disease (1 is best)
$  0.72 0.86 0.89  21.1 
Livestock affected by lack of water and grazing land (1 is 
best)
$ 
0.71 0.78 0.78  22.3 
Number of days lost by adults in last month per adult  0.66  0.45  0.39  3.1 
Adults died in last six months  n.a.  0.04  0.02  4.1 
Lower harvest linked to not having labour due to illness  0.19  n.a.  0.13  14.6 
Lower harvest due to not finding labour when needed  0.18  n.a.  0.13  13.8 
Lower harvest due to not finding oxen at right time  0.40  n.a.  0.27  29.6 
$index based on reported problems. 1 means no problems reported. 0 means all possible problems 
occur. Rain index (individual) is based on problems for own activities from rainfall, including whether 
it rained during harvest, irregularly for own crops, etc. Crop index is based on reported moderate or 
serious crop failures. 
*The results on the variance-decomposition are obtained allowing for time-varying village level means 
on the pooled data set across rounds. In practice, this village-level variance is the R
2 of a regression on 
a full set of time-varying village level dummies.  
**Figure for consumption refers to the variance of the log of real consumption per adult. 
n.a.=not available 
Source: Dercon and Krishnan (1999b). 
 
Other studies also find that the idiosyncratic part of income risk is relatively large. 
Deaton (1997) finds that common components for particular villages explain very 
little of the variation of household income changes within villages in the Côte d’Ivoire 
LSMS data for 1985-86. Townsend (1995) reports evidence from a Thai household  3 
data set, suggesting that there are few common regional components in income 
growth. The Indian ICRISAT-data suggest also relatively limited co-movement in 
incomes within the villages (Townsend (1995)). Murdoch (1991) suggests that 
idiosyncratic risk (inclusive of measurement error) accounts for 75 to 96 percent of 
the total variance in income in these villages. Udry (1991) reports similar magnitudes 
for Northern Nigeria.  
 
Other characteristics of income risk include the frequency of shocks and the repeated 
nature (see also Murdoch (1997)). Relatively small but frequent shocks are more 
easily to deal with than large, infrequent negative shocks. Examples of the latter are 
disability or chronic illness; the former are events such as transient illness. Gertler and 
Gruber (1997) find that, in terms of consumption levels, households in their sample 
from Indonesia can only protect 30 percent of the low-frequency health shocks with 
serious long term effects, but about 70 percent of the high-frequency smaller health 
shocks.  
 
If shocks come together, i.e. bad shocks are repeated over time, then coping is more 
difficult. Theoretically, the effects of autocorrelation on buffer stock behaviour are 
explored by Deaton (1991). Using panel data from Pakistan, Alderman (1998) finds 
that with successive shocks, consumption smoothing is more difficult than with a 
single shocks. 
 
The nature of the shock is important to understand the possibilities to deal with its 
consequences. Idiosyncratic shocks can be insured within a community, but common 
shocks cannot: if everybody is affected, the risk cannot be shared. Formal or informal 
insurance transfers (credit or insurance) from outside the community are necessary; 
intertemporal transfers (e.g. depletion of individual or community-level savings) are 
also possible.  
 
•  Households in risky environments have developed sophisticated (ex-ante) risk-
management and (ex-post) risk-coping strategies, including self-insurance via 
savings and informal insurance mechanisms. 
  
Households do not just undergo the consequences of high risk. Livelihood systems 
have developed that focus on long-term survival and well-being. There are different 
ways to characterise these systems. Alderman and Paxson (1994) distinguish risk-
management from risk-coping strategies. The former attempt to affect ex-ante the 
riskiness of the income process (‘income smoothing’). Examples are income 
diversification, through combining activities with low positive covariance and 
income-skewing, i.e. taking up low risk activities even at the cost of low return. In 
practice, this implies that households are usually involved in a variety of activities, 
including farm and off-farm activities, use seasonal migration to diversify, etc. 
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), Morduch (1990), Alderman and Paxson (1994) 
give more references). They are usually household or individually based but may also 
involve neighbours, relatives or kingroups (Fafchamps (1992)) (see also section 3).   
 
Risk-coping strategies involve self-insurance (through precautionary savings) and 
informal group-based risk-sharing. They deal with the consequences (ex-post)  of 
income risk (‘consumption smoothing’). Households can insure themselves, by  4 
building up assets in ‘good’ years, to deplete these stocks in ‘bad’ years.  Deaton 
(1991) has shown that precautionary savings can provide quite an effective, even 
though imperfect strategy for households in dealing with income risk. Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin (1993) report the use of bullocks in India to smooth consumption. Czukas 
et al. (1998), however, find little evidence of smoothing through sales of livestock (for 
a further discussion, see section 2). 
 
Alternatively, informal arrangements can develop between members of a group or 
village to support each other in case of hardship. These mechanisms are often 
observed operating within extended families, ethnic groups, neighbourhood groups 
and professional networks. In recent years, these mechanisms have been studied 
theoretically and empirically in variety of settings (even though mainly in a few 
villages in India) (theoretically by Coate and Ravallion (1993), in ICRISAT-villages 
by Townsend (1994) and Ligon et al. (1997); empirically in the Philippines by Lund 
and Fafchamps (1997)) (see also section 4).  
 
Risk-coping strategies may also involve attempting to earn extra income when 
hardship occurs. Kochar (1995) reports increased labour supply as the key response in 
the ICRISAT villages. The literature on coping strategies when famine strikes also 
regularly report attempts to earn additional income through a reallocation of labour, 
including temporary migration, earning income from collecting wild foods (also for 
own consumption), gathering activities (such as increased firewood collection), etc. 
Dessalegn Rahmato (1991) reports all these responses during the famine in Wollo in 
Ethiopia in 1984-85; similar responses were noticed in Sudan (De Waal (1987)). 
Other examples are in Corbett (1988)
2 (for more details, see section 3).  
 
Group-based insurance mechanisms are geared towards insuring idiosyncratic shocks, 
affecting some members but not to all. They obviously cannot provide insurance to 
deal with shocks common to all members. Self-insurance can, in principle, deal with 
any type of shock, as long as ex-ante sufficiently large resources have been built up. 
Recent work has highlighted the links between informal insurance and self-insurance 
(e.g. Ligon et al. (1998)) and below we discuss this in more detail (section 4), since 
this has important implications for policy design. 
 
•  Formal credit and insurance markets appear to contribute only little to reducing 
income risk and its consequences. Informal credit and insurance, however 
incomplete, helps to cope with risky incomes. 
                                                 
2The social sciences literature on household strategies dealing with shocks often uses a different 
terminology. For example, Davies (1996) uses ‘coping strategies’ to describe strategies employed 
during crises, where coping suggests success in dealing with the crisis, while ‘adaption’ is a 
characteristic of a ‘vulnerable’ household, using ‘coping’ strategies as part of standard behaviour. 
Adaptive strategies are then defined as a permanent change in the mix of ways in which households 
make a living, irrespective of the year in question. For a good review, see Moser (1998).  In this paper, 
we consider a framework in which households develop strategies to deal with contingencies. A 
distinction between adaption and coping seems less relevant. Any coping strategies will need ex-ante 
actions, such as forming informal networks, or building up savings. Consequently, all households will 
have adapted their livelihood to serve their own objectives as good as possible – and whether this 
includes more or less ‘traditional’ coping strategies is conceptually irrelevant, although as will be seen, 
it has analytical and policy implications, e.g. regarding long-term incomes.  
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These high risks are not easily insured via formal market mechanisms. Credit and 
insurance markets are typically absent or incomplete for good theoretical reasons or 
linked to bad policy (for surveys, see Bell (1988) or Besley (1994)).  Consumption 
loans are rare. Nevertheless, traditional credit systems (Roscas, Susu, Tontines) often 
include a lending possibility, which may be used for consumption purposes. Formal 
loans or loans in microfinance programmes also often serve consumption purposes via 
their fungibility. Informal credit markets also appears to adjust to high-risk 
environments. Udry (1994) reports that informal loans in rural Nigeria appear to take 
the form of state contingent loans. Repayment is conditional on income outcomes of 
both borrowers and lenders: negative shocks are translated into more favourable terms 
for the agent experiencing them. 
 
•  Despite these strategies, vulnerability remains high and is reflected in fluctuations 
in consumption. It is therefore clear that further development of safety nets will be 
necessary.  
 
Despite the existence of these systems, high variability in consumption outcomes 
remains. Townsend (1995) noted that income variability remains high in the ICRISAT 
data for India: diversification and other income strategies are only used to a limited 
extent and in any case insufficient. Risk coping strategies are also typically 
insufficient. Work on India estimates that transfers amount to less than 10 percent of 
the typical income shocks (Rosenzweig (1988)). Townsend (1994) reports strong 
evidence of insurance (risk-sharing) in the ICRISAT villages, even though it is still 
only partial insurance, not full insurance
3. Other studies also suggested imperfect risk-
sharing or consumption smoothing (Paxson (1993), Chaudhuri and Paxson (1994), 
Deaton (1992), Deaton (1991), Morduch (1991), see also Deaton (1997) for several 
examples).  
 
The experiences during the large famines in the Horn in the mid-1980s also illustrated 
the limitations of these coping strategies. Dessalegn Rahmato (1991) has documented 
in detail the complexitiy of these strategies, but the results were still dramatic. 
Reardon et al. (1988) report that transfers in the aftermath of the 1984 drought were 
only equivalent to 3 percent of the losses for the poorest households in the Sahel. 
Recent events in East-Asia during the recent crisis also exposed the limitations of 
informal insurance and self-insurance. Large increases in consumption poverty have 
been reported, especially for rural households in remote areas or those dependent on 
transfers from urban areas, households relying on seasonal migration, and those 
households who also experienced the El-Niño related drought in the same period. 
                                                 
3 Risk-sharing in this sample could be due to inter-household relationships but also due to self-
insurance. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) find that bullocks sales and purchases contribute to 
consumption smoothing in these villages (at the cost of higher returns). The evidence from Townsend 
(1994) has also been questioned by Chaudhuri and Ravallion (1996) on econometric and other grounds. 
They suggest only limited insurance. 
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•  Fluctuations in consumption usually imply relatively high levels of transient 
poverty. High income risk may also be a cause of persistent poverty. 
 
The resulting consumption fluctuations can be expressed in terms of vulnerability to 
fall below a particular minimum consumption level, either temporary or in a 
permanent way. Different operational definitions of this idea exist in the literature. 
Ravallion (1988) considers transient versus chronic poverty. The chronically poor are 
defined as those with average consumption below the poverty line. Chronic poverty 
for an individual can then be measured using average consumption as the welfare 
indicator. Transient poverty for an individual is the average poverty over time minus 
chronic poverty. Aggregation using procedures as in standard poverty measures 
provides an overall measure of transient poverty. Using these definitions, Ravallion 
(1988) finds that about half of total poverty is transient in the ICRISAT-sample; Jalan 
and Ravallion (1996) find high transient poverty in panel data from rural China: half 
of the mean squared poverty gap is transient. Other definitions of chronic and 
transient poverty are possible; the outcomes are similar. For example, using income 
data over 9 years from the ICRISAT panel in India, Gaiha and Deolalikar (1993) 
report that about a fifth of households were poor in each year, but that only 12 percent 
were never poor – most households were poor for some time.  
 
The poorest households are typically least insured against shocks. For example, 
Ravallion and Jalan (1997) report that for the poorest wealth decile, 40 percent of an 
income shock is being passed onto current consumption. By contrast, consumption by 
the richest third of households is protected from almost 90 percent of an income 
shock.  
 
However, high income risk and the need to cope with its consequences may have 
implications for chronic poverty: households may be forced to forgo higher returns for 
more stable consumption, even at low levels. The theory is developed in Eswaran and 
Kotwal (1989); empirical examples include Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), 
Morduch (1990), Dasgupta (1993), Dercon (1996) and (with some dissent) Jalan and 
Ravallion (1998). These are discussed in more detail in section 3. 
 
•  The failure to cope with income risk is not only reflected in household 
consumption fluctuations. Effects on nutrition, health and education are also 
observed, as are intra-household consequences. 
 
Rose (1994) finds that in rural India negative rainfall shocks are associated with 
higher boy and girl mortality rates in landless households, but not in households with 
lots of land. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find that in South India (ICRISAT-villages) 
children are often taken out of school in response to adverse income shocks; the result 
is lower accumulation of human capital. Foster (1995) shows that child growth was 
affecgted during and after the severe floods in Bangladesh in 1988. He does not find 
evidence of a sex bias. But other studies find such a bias. Using ICRISAT-data, 
Behrman (1988) shows that the inability to smooth consumption implies that child 
health suffers in the period before the major harvest; girls are most affected. Behrman 
and Deolalikar (1990), using data on individual nutrient intakes from India, report that 
estimated price and wage elasticities of intakes are substantially and significantly  7 
higher for females than for males, suggesting that women and girls share a 
disproportionate burden of rising food prices.  
 
Dercon and Krishnan (1999) test risk-sharing within rural households in Ethiopia. 
Adult nutrition is used to investigate whether individuals are able to smooth their 
consumption and within the household over the seasons. Within poor households in 
the southern part of the country, households do not engage in complete risk-sharing 
between husbands and wives; women in these households bear the brunt of adverse 
shocks. An average loss of labour due to illness for a female in a poor, southern 
Ethiopian household results in a loss of 1.6 to 2.3 percent of body weight due to the 
lack of risk-sharing.  
 
•  In this paper, we focus on the opportunities available to households to use risk-
management and risk-coping strategies, and on the constraints on their 
effectiveness.  
 
In the next section, we focus on self-insurance via savings. The advantages of savings 
for consumption smoothing are well understood. What is less discussed is the factors 
that may cause households not to be able to use this strategy effectively. 
Consequently, we will focus on these issues. In section 3, we will focus on the risk 
management strategies: income-smoothing strategies, such as diversification of 
activities or skewing the income portfolio towards low risk activities. We will also 
discuss the link with assets. In section 4, we discuss risk-coping strategies via 
informal insurance. In section 5, we discuss the possibilities to inform policy by 
monitoring vulnerability and consumption-risk reducing strategies. In section 6, we 
conclude. 
 
2.  Asset strategies 
 
•  Deaton’s model provides a useful description of the advantages of self-insurance. 
Policy conclusions may be limited however. 
 
Deaton (1991) sets out clearly the benefits of self-insurance via savings when credit 
markets are imperfect. In his model, the household maximises intertemporal expected 
utility. Instantaneous utility is concave and the individual has a precautionary motive 
(convex marginal utility). It can save, receiving a safe return r on the asset. Income is 
stationary and risky
4. Households are impatient, in that their rate of time preference δ 
is large. The result is that r<δ. Deaton shows that if households are infinitely lived (a 
‘dynasty’) then households will build up assets in good years to deplete in bad years. 
Assets will not be systematically accumulated to very large levels due to impatience. 
We observe high frequency fluctuations in savings, consumption smoother than 
income, even though it is still possible that, after bad luck in the form of sequence of 
bad draws, consumption is very low, i.e. a deep crisis is not easily insured. Deaton 
plausibly argues that for many developing countries, this model fits well with some of 
the stylised facts of occasional low consumption, low asset holdings and high 
frequency of asset transactions.  
 
                                                 
4 In the basic model it is also i.i.d., but this assumption is relaxed in further simulations.  8 
However, it is not easy to draw policy conclusions from this work, except for 
developing credit and insurance markets, which, as is well known, face inherent 
problems not easily addressed by interventions (Besley (1994)). In many ways the 
result follow largely from the impatience of households: if only they were patient, they 
would build up sufficient assets to cope with future stress. 
 
•  In practice, assets are risky, not safe. The covariance of asset values and income 
due to common shocks makes self-insurance a far less useful strategy than it 
seems. 
 
Deaton’s model assumes that savings can occur in a safe form with a positive rate of 
return. In practice, this may not be possible. The lack of integration of asset markets 
and difficulties that face the poor in obtaining access to the better (internationally 
traded) assets and securities means that the portfolio of assets available to the poor is 
far from ideal. When a common negative shock occurs, incomes are low and returns 
to different assets are also low – often even negative. As a consequence, just when 
assets are needed, net stocks could be low as well. For example, if assets are kept in 
the form of livestock (as they are commonly throughout most of the developing 
world!), then during a drought not just are crop incomes low, but some livestock may 
die as well and fertility will be low. The consequence is a smaller herd or even loss of 
all livestock, just when needed as part of the self-insurance scheme
5.  Similarly, stock 
market returns may be low when crisis hits an economy - as recent experience in Asia 
has shown. To the extent that some of these stocks are kept for precautionary motives, 
similar effects occur. 
 
Another form of risk related to assets is not so much related to the return per se, but to 
the terms of trade of assets relative to consumption. If a negative common shock 
occurs, households would like to sell some of their assets. However, if everybody 
wants to sell their assets, asset prices will collapse and the consumption that can be 
purchased with the sale of assets will be lower. Similarly, when a positive shock 
occurs, all will want to buy assets for future protection, but then prices will be pushed 
up. In all, self-insurance becomes far more expensive as a strategy.  
 
There is a lot of evidence, albeit some of it anecdotal, that this is indeed common 
occurrence. During the famine in Ethiopia in 1984-85, terms of trade between 
livestock and food collapsed – relative food prices became three times higher than 
usual, reducing the purchasing power of assets by two-thirds. In recent times, house 
prices in Indonesia and other Asian economies have collapsed after a boom during the 
early 1990s. 
 
Note that the same occurs during positive shocks. Bevan et al. (1991) reported on the 
construction boom taking place during the coffee boom in the mid-1970s in Kenya: 
prices for construction materials and other durables increased considerably. 
Households tried to put some of their positive windfalls into more assets, but their 
choice set was strongly restricted due to the macroeconomic policies.   
                                                 
5 Note that this type of risk in returns to assets are not limited to commodity-based assets. The risk of 
bank bankcruptcy and a run to withdraw deposits during economic crisis means that seemingly safe 
assets are in fact also risky with covariate returns with incomes.  9 
 
•  We can quantify the consequences of holding risky assets that are covariate with 
incomes, using simulations. 
 
Using a simple model and some simulations, we can illustrate some of the problems 
arising from asset market imperfections in this context. Let the household maximise a 
standard intertemporally separable utility function u. Instantaneous utility v is defined 
over consumption c and strictly concave. Let δ be the rate of time preference. So at t, 
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Let yt be risky income and At, the stock of assets.  Assets have a risky return rt.  
However, we also introduce the complication that assets are kept in another form than 
consumption units. With consumption prices as the numéraire, transforming 
consumption into assets is at a price pt per unit of the asset. We can think of pt as the 
terms of trade or the exchange rate between the asset and consumption, or 
equivalently, a measure of the purchasing power of assets at t. See above for some 
examples where this may be relevant. 
 
The asset equation linking period t and t+1 can be written as 
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We introduce credit constraints in a simple way, stating that assets can never be non-
negative, or 
  t At ∀ ≥ , 0  (3) 
 
Restricting ct, yt, pt and (1+rt) to non-negative values only, we can write the optimal 
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Households will consume and not save until intertemporally, appropriately discounted 
and valued expected marginal utility is equated to current marginal utility (second 
term on the right-hand side); however, if liquidity constraints bind, then the first term 
will be higher, so that all assets and income are used for consumption. Equation (4) is 
standard, except for the relative prices of assets. Note that in this formulation, the path 
of prices (pt+1/pt) is relevant for evaluating expected future utility relative to current 
marginal utility, while only rt+1 matters, not rt
6. This allows us to consider different 
ways risk can enter into asset values over time. 
 
                                                 
6Formally, this means that current prices pt are a state variable in the dynamic programming problem, 
besides the current value of assets plus income. When evaluating the future value of our assets, we need 
to take into account the current rate of exchange (terms of trade) between assets and consumption. The 
reason is that any reduction in consumption today needs to be transformed into assets using pt, , so that 
assets can be carried over to the future; in the future, to consume the asset, it should be transformed 
again into consumption units using pt+1. Consequently, the current state at t is not fully described by the 
current means on hand, but we also need to consider the current price pt.  10 
Further analytical results on the consequences of risk in asset values are not obviously 
obtained. Using (4), we can however conduct some numerical simulations using 
different assumptions about risk. We consider a finite life-cycle with T=20 and 
assume that at the beginning of the first year, assets are equal to zero. Utility is 
logarithmic in consumption (v(ct) = lnct). Income is risky and we assume that income 
is approximately normally distributed with mean 50 and a standard deviation of 10
7. 
We use a rate of time preference of 5 percent per period t. We can deploy different 
assumptions about the risk related to assets; however, in all cases, households know 
the distributions and moments of the random variables, but not the actual draw when 
making decisions (rational expectations). We also use different assumptions about the 
covariance between the risk in assets and the income risk. 
 
To evaluate the consequences of different risk processes and their covariance, we 
simply calculate a risk premium. We define this as the consumption the household is 
willing to give up in the first year to obtain the optimal path of consumption without 
liquidity constraints (i.e. with perfect credit and insurance markets)
8. If the household 
did not have access to any form of savings or credit, i.e. consumption and income are 
equal in each period, then we find that, under our assumptions, the risk premium 
implied by our assumption is 19.8 percent. Obviously, access to savings instruments, 
however imperfect, could improve on this percentage. The success of self-insurance 
can be measured by the reduction in the risk-premium via savings and assets. We 
therefore also give the percentage of the total risk premium (i.e. of 19.8 percent) that 
is recovered through using self-insurance.  
 
We need to specify the different possible risk processes of assets and the covariance 
with income. Table 3 summarises the cases considered. In general we assume 
approximately normally distributed risk processes, using power points
6. We 
distinguish three cases. Case 1 considers a safe asset – no risk in terms of trade or in 
return. Case 2 considers a risky return to the asset, although no risk in the terms of 
trade. We assume an (approximately) bivariate normal distribution with correlation 
coefficient ρyr taking on different values to allow for different forms of covariance. 
For simplicity, all variables are independently and identically distributed over time
9. 
Note that the values chosen imply a coefficient of variation in asset returns and in 
income of 0.20. Case 3 considers a safe return to the asset, but risk in the terms of 
trade. Again, an (approximately) bivariate normal distribution with correlation 
coefficient ρyp is assumed. All variables are independently and identically distributed 
over time. The coefficient of variation of the terms of trade is also assumed to be 0.20. 
(Case 4 and 5 are discussed below.) 
 
                                                 
7In particular, we approximate the normal distribution using 10 power points taken as mean values for 
each of the corresponding deciles of the distribution. In this way, we allow the computations to 
converge rather faster, but also avoid the problem of negative incomes, inherent if we assume the 
normal distribution. 
8It is evaluated at zero assets and with income and asset prices equal to mean values. 
9 Deaton (1992) introduces another complication: autocorrelation in income over time. In general, he 
finds that this makes self-insurance via savings far more costly, since much higher asset holdings have 
to be kept to obtain the same insurance (since bad years will come in sequence). We can expect that 
introducing autocorrelation in our simulations would have given exactly this effect, increasing the risk 
premium that remains after self-insurance.  11 
Table 3    Values for simulations used 
Case Assumptions  used  Description 
Case 1: 
 safe asset 
yt ~ N(µy, σy)= N(50, 10)  
 
pt ≡ 1, ∀t=1,…20. 
 
rt ≡ 0.05, ∀t 
Safe assets, with 





in asset returns 
((1+rt,), yt) ~ i.i.d.N2(µr , µy, σr, σy, ρyr) 
                  = N2(1.05, 50, 0.21, 10, ρyr) 
 
ρyr  ∈ {-1, -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1} 
 
pt ≡ 1, ∀t=1,…20. 
Bivariate normally 
distributed asset returns 
rt and income yt. Asset 
terms of trade pt 
constant. Covariance 
between income and 
asset returns possible. 
Case 3: 
Covariate terms 
of trade risk 
(pt,yt) ~ i.i.d. N2(µp, µy, σp , σy, ρyp) 
          = N2(1.00, 50, 0.20, 10, ρyp)   
 
ρyp  ∈ {-1, -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1} 
 
rt ≡ 0.05, ∀t=1,…20. 
Bivariate normally 
distributed asset terms 
of trade pt and income 
yt. Asset return rt safe.  
Covariance between 




in asset returns, 
lumpy assets 
 
As in 2 but At ∈ù, pt=10  Case 2 but lumpy asset 
to be bought and sold in 




of trade risk, 
lumpy assets 
As in 3 but At ∈ù, µp =10  Case 3 but lumpy asset 
to be bought and sold in 
lumpy units with mean 
price of 10 
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Table 4    Risk premia with imperfect assets under liquidity constraints 
Case Correlation 
coefficient between 
the asset and 
income risk process 
(ρ) 
Risk premium as a 
percentage of the 
mean of the income 
process y.
a 
One minus the risk 
premium, as a 
percentage of risk 




Income risk, yt = ct  
(no assets) 
n.a. 19.8 0.0 
Case 1:  None 6.4  67.6 
safe asset      
     
Case 2: -0.5  5.7  71.3 
Covariate risk in  0  7.0  64.7 
asset returns 0.5  8.2  58.5 
  1 9.4  52.5 
Case 3:  -0.5 -0.7  103.7 
Covariate terms of   0 9.9  49.9 
trade risk  0.5 16.7  15.7 
 1  19.8  0.1 
Case 4:     
Case 2 with   0 9.6  51.4 
lumpy asset  0.5 10.6  46.7 
 1  11.5  41.9 
Case 5:  -0.5 1.7 91.5 
Case 3 with   0 12.5  36.8 
lumpy asset  0.5 19.0 4.1 
 1  19.8  0 
      
Simulations using equation (4), (backward solution) with logarithmic utility, T=20, δ=0.05. 
a = the amount the household is willing to give up in the first period to get rid of all uncertainty. 
b = the percentage of the risk premium that is recovered by savings, i.e. the value in column (3) divided 
by 19.8 percent. 
 
The results of the numerical simulations using these assumptions are given in table 4. 
In each period, there is a draw of income and if applicable, of the terms of trade of 
assets and of the rate of return. On the basis of this information and assets carried over 
from last period, the household will decide its optimal consumption and asset holding. 
The algorithm uses the optimal program, based on the backward solution of condition 
(4). The results show the consequences of risk in assets and covariance with income. 
First, comparing the benchmark with the case of a safe asset, we notice that two-thirds 
of the risk premium is recovered through self-insurance. However, if we introduce 
risk in the returns to assets, then this risk premium goes up, unless income and asset 
returns are negatively correlated. Negative correlation (ρyr<0) simply means that 
whenever one wants to sell assets to smooth consumption due to a bad income draw, 
asset returns happen to be higher, so they are obviously more attractive and useful. 
Positive covariance gradually reduces the effectiveness of the asset as a buffer for 
consumption. When income and asset returns are perfectly correlated (ρyr=1), the risk  13 
premium has increased by almost half. Self-insurance is still useful – the risk premium 
is still less than half than in the benchmark. 
 
The situation changes when the risk is in the terms of trade or exchange rate between 
assets and consumption or income. Recall that positive covariance means pricy assets 
whenever income is high (and households want to buy), and very low exchange rates 
when income is low (and households want to sell).  It is clear that terms of trade risk 
reduces the ability to smooth consumption via self-insurance. Even without covariate 
income and asset prices, this source of risk is very costly, increasing the risk-premium 
by half relative to the case of a safe asset: the non-zero probability that you may need 
to sell cheap and buy at high prices is causing this. Also, with a positive covariance 
between income and the asset terms of trade, self-insurance quickly loses its 
attractiveness – even with a correlation coefficient ρpy of 0.5, very little benefit can be 
obtained from savings in this form. Although these are results based on numerical 
solutions, the difference is between risk in the returns to assets and in the terms of 
trade of assets is intrinsic, and not just dependent on the numerical example used. In 
the latter case, with positive covariance, not only results a bad draw for low asset 
values when you would want to sell them (this is also the case when there is a bad 
draw in asset returns). Also, when income is high, windfall income is transformed into 
assets only at a high price, when terms of trade risk is present (which is not the case 
when we have risk in asset returns). In other words, the current asset terms of trade 
affect the effectiveness of transforming income into assets.  
 
There is some evidence of household behaviour consistent with these predictions. 
During the 1984-85 famine, households in Ethiopia were observed rather to cut their 
consumption to dangerously low levels rather than sell their assets, when asset terms 
of trade had totally collapsed. This is consistent with the model described above: the 
return in terms of consumption of keeping on to their assets is very high, since at 
present very little consumption can be obtained. Also, Czukas et al. (1998) present 
evidence, consistent with this model. They find that livestock sales (both cattle and 
small stock) combined offset at most thirty percent, and probably closer to only fifteen 
percent of the crop income shortfall endured during severe drought.   
 
•  Access to relatively safe and profitable assets, which might be useful for 
consumption smoothing, may also be limited. Lumpiness in assets may be a reason 
why the poor cannot protect themselves easily via assets. 
 
While risk in returns and terms of trade may limit in certain circumstances the use of 
assets to smooth consumption, there are examples where assets contribute to 
consumption smoothing. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) have shown that bullock 
sales contribute to consumption smoothing in the South Indian ICRISAT villages, 
although Lim and Townsend (1994) argue that crop inventory appears to be the main 
strategy. Access to assets for smoothing may however not be self-evident. For 
example, buying and selling cattle is generally recognised a common strategy to cope 
with income fluctuations in many rural areas (Binswanger and McIntire (1987), 
Davies (1996)). However, a relatively large proportion of households often do not 
own any. Dercon (1998) finds that only half the households in a sample in Western 
Tanzania own cattle, even though cattle are important in the farming system and in 
their culture. The explanation is not that the others simply choose to enter into other  14 
activities; rather, investing into livestock requires a sizeable surplus: livestock are 
lumpy. A cow, for example, costs about a fifth of mean crop income. Cattle ownership 
is generally determined by endowments in male labour and land, suggesting that those 
with a poorer endowment cannot generate sufficient means to enter into cattle rearing, 
leaving them relatively more exposed to income risk.  
 
The consequences of lumpy assets are easily illustrated via simulations. In table 3 and 
4 we have added two more simulations: case 2 and case 3 are repeated but with lumpy 
assets, so that they cost (on average) one-fifth of mean income. One can see that the 
risk premium increases quite significantly, and that the effectiveness of using the asset 
is reduced, especially if positive covariance is present. Dercon (1998) present other 
simulations, such as on the number of periods that a poor household may have no 
assets left to use as a buffer stock, exposing it to the consequences of bad shocks. 
 
•  Risk in returns to assets and especially in the terms of trade between assets and 
consumption, covariate with household income, and assets that are lumpy, affect 
the possibilities for self-insurance. Consequently, policies that influence asset 
market risks could be beneficial to households attempting to deal with shocks.  
 
Despite the fact that the simulations are numerical, and partly dependent on the actual 
values used, we can definitely conclude that risk in asset values, whether in the returns 
or in their terms of trade, affects the ability to self-insure. Furthermore, the largest 
effects stem not from risk per se, but from the covariance between asset values and 
income. Positive covariance is not unrealistic: when an economy-wide shock occurs 
incomes are likely to decline but so also will asset values. From these simulations, we 
find a large reduction in the opportunity to effectively self-insure.  
 
•  Policies could include providing more attractive and diversified savings 
instruments. Microfinance initiatives should put savings for self-insurance on the 
agenda. Macroeconomic stability during income downturns would also allow self-
insurance to function better. 
 
Providing households access to better, a larger set and less risky assets should avoid 
some of these problems. Integrating asset markets with the wider economy could 
avoid much of the often-observed covariate movements in asset prices and incomes. 
For example, if in rural Africa or India, holding other assets, such as low cost 
financial savings via post-office accounts etc. could be facilitated, then communities 
could use alternatives to animals to store wealth. Introducing a focus on savings for 
self-insurance in the booming number of initiatives related to microfinance operations 
could be of help. 
 
The terms of trade risk between assets and consumption is of particular concern. This 
has partly to do with macroeconomic stability. For example, terms of trade declines 
often coincide with consumer price increases relative to asset prices (e.g. in the 
famines in Bangladesh in 1974, in Ethiopia in 1985). Low inflation and exchange rate 
stability could reduce these large shocks in relative prices when incomes are low. 
Policies that limit the macroeconomic effects of common shocks would enhance self-
insurance. 
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3. Income smoothing strategies 
 
•  Income smoothing can be achieved by income portfolio adjustments.  
 
In this section, we consider income smoothing, i.e. strategies which reduce the risk in 
the income process. Often, the strategy considered is diversification of income 
sources. Theoretically, as long as the different income sources are not perfectly 
covariate (i.e. they have a correlation coefficient below 1), then there will be a 
reduction in total income risk from combining two income sources with the same 
mean and variance. Stated like this, there appear to be no costs involved: mean 
income is the same. It is useful therefore to consider also another income-based 
strategy, in which mean income is reduced to obtain lower risk. One could refer to this 
as income-skewing: resources are allocated towards low risk-low return activities. In 
the extreme, this will not show up as diversification: as Collier and Gunning (1999) 
argue, the poor may well be more specialised in a low risk-low return activity. In this 
section we will discuss how effective income smoothing is, the limitations to using of 
(mean preserving) diversification, and the determinants and costs of diversification 
and income skewing.    
 
•  In practice relatively little income smoothing (via income portfolio adjustments) is 
achieved by poorer households. 
 
Many studies have emphasised the extent to which households diversify income 
sources.  Across the developing world, farm households achieve a substantial share of 
income from non-farm activities (Reardon et al. (1994), and the many references in 
the study, Collier and Lal (1986), Collier and Gunning (1999)). Reardon et al. (1994, 
p.240) report an average share of 39 percent in across 8 countries in rural West-Africa. 
Besides non-agricultural activities, households fragment their land holdings into many 
plots, grow different crops or engage in local farm wage employment. But is 
diversification effective in practice? Townsend (1995, p.85) suggests that in the 
ICRISAT villages in India, substantial scope for diversification exists, but in practice 
relatively little takes place. Or at least, income remains highly variable. Other 
examples were provided above. 
 
•  Income diversification for effective risk-reduction appears limited. Observed 
diversification patterns are often not aimed at reducing risk. Households face 
entry constraints to enter into profitable activities. 
 
What are the limits of income diversification strategies? First, it should be emphasised 
that, contrary to the impression created, combining different income sources is not 
necessarily meant to handle risk. For example, different activities may be conducted at 
different times (e.g. seasonal activities), providing income across the year by serving 
to smooth labour over time. Also, activities often described as risk-spreading, such as 
intercropping, may in fact serve to increase returns, even at the cost of increased 
variability (Carter (1991)).  
  16 
Secondly, while in ‘normal’ years, farm and off-farm activities may be relatively 
uncorrelated, during crises, they may move together. Since downturns could be severe, 
this would severely limit the use of diversification. There is evidence that this is the 
case. Czukas et al. (1998) find evidence that non-farm income is also positively 
correlated with shocks affecting crop income: drought adversely affects not only crop 
income but also non-farm income. They refer to Sen’s analysis of famine – crop 
failure leads to a collapse of the demand for local services and crafts, limiting the use 
of diversification to handle risk. 
 
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, non-agricultural activities or profitable 
alternative agricultural activities are not accessed easily. Most effectively-risk-
reducing activities with a reasonable return cannot be easily entered. Entry constraints 
could take the form of working capital needs, skills requirements etc. Reardon et al. 
(1988) report that richer household have a higher share of nonfarm income in Burkina 
Faso, i.e. the poor seem less diversified. Reardon (1997) suggest that entry constraints 
exist in Kenya. Hussein and Nelson (1998) give numerous other examples. 
 
Dercon and Krishnan (1996) look explicitly at the role of different constraints to enter 
into activities in Tanzania and Ethiopia. They find that the poor typically enter into 
activities with low entry costs: firewood collection, charcoal, collecting dung cakes, 
casual agricultural wage employment, etc. Entry into high return non-crop activities, 
such as cattle rearing or shop keeping, is restricted to richer households, presumably 
with access to capital. Non-agricultural wage employment is restricted to those with 
education. When asked, most households would like to invest  into cattle rearing and 
to a lesser extent, trade and business. More recent data from Ethiopia on non-farm 
business activities and the investments typically needed to enter into these affected 
seems to confirm the relatively high capital needs for some activities. While some 
activities require virtually no investment, others where quite costly. Median 
investment into charcoal making, dungcakes collection, handicrafts, weaving or food 
processing was between 0 and 20 birr (3 U.S. dollars), but the returns to these 
activities are relatively low. More lucrative activities, such starting a shop, entering 
into livestock trade or transport services required  300 to 550 birr (about $45 to $80). 
A mature cow costs about 400 birr ($60). These are large sums in an economy with 
mean per adult income below $200 (own calculation from data from Ethiopian Rural 
Household Survey 1995). 
 
Dercon (1998) looked further at the evidence on whether activity choice towards high 
return activities in rural Tanzania is affected by entry constraints or by comparative 
advantage, and finds the former far more relevant. Risk considerations matter as well, 
but only forcing the poorer households to enter into low return activities. This leads us 
to the next point.  
 
•  Income risk reduction often comes at a cost. Income skewing is likely if less 
protection is available through assets. The long-term consequences for the asset-
poor are lower average incomes and a higher income gap relative to asset-rich 
households. 
 
Profitable or mean income preserving diversification is therefore not easily possible. 
Collier and Gunning (1999, p.83), building on the evidence discussed above, suggest  17 
that the poor have to enter into low return-capital extensive activities, since high 
return activities require capital. The poor are less diversified despite facing more 
serious consequences of bad income draws with limited insurance and credit market 
imperfections. The implication is that many diversification or income skewing 
strategies are actually mean income reducing, making them less interesting for 
households: lower risk will have to be weighed against low returns, providing another 
reason for the limited income smoothing achieved in practice.  
 
Another implication is that income-based strategies are directly linked to asset-based 
strategies (and other forms of protections offered, such as by informal insurance). As 
analysed by Eswaran and Kotwal (1989), credit can serve as insurance substitute but 
credit market imperfections usually imply collateralised lending. The consequence is 
that asset-poor households cannot enter into high-risk activities, since downside risks 
are too high, while asset rich households do not face this problem. Those with access 
to (liquid) assets can borrow in terms of crisis, or, if credit is absent, sell them as part 
of a buffer stock strategy. To handle income risk, asset-poor households will have to 
enter low-risk, low-return activities. The consequence is further impoverishment, or at 
least increased inequality.  
 
There is evidence that this indeed is happening. Morduch (1990), using the ICRISAT 
sample, shows that asset-poor households devote a larger share of land to safer 
traditional varieties of rice and castor than to riskier but high-return varieties
10. 
Dercon (1996) finds that households with limited liquid asset (livestock) grow 
proportionately more sweet potatoes, a low-return, low risk crop. A household with an 
average livestock holding has a proportion of land allocated to sweet potatoes which 
is 20 percent smaller than for a household with no liquid assets. The return per adult is 
25 percent higher for the crop portfolio of the wealthiest group compared to the 
poorest quintile. Choosing a less risky crop portfolio has substantial consequences for 
incomes.  
 
Bliss and Stern (1982) found that fertiliser was underutilised in Palanpur, India.   
Fertiliser, as many purchased inputs in general, can be considered high return but also 
high risk, since they increase yields, but by using less, investment losses in bad years 
are reduced. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) suggests that the portfolio of 
activities (and investments) in the ICRISAT villages in India is affected by high risk. 
Increasing the coefficient of variation of rainfall timing by one standard deviation 
would reduce farm profits for the poorest quartile by 35 percent; for the richest 
quartile the effect is negligible. Efficiency is affected and average incomes of the poor 
are reduced. Wealthier farmers are not affected and achieve therefore higher incomes. 
The long-term wealth distribution is affected: 54 percent of wealth is held by the top 
20 percent of households.  
 
Jalan and Ravallion (1998) use data on China to test other behavioural responses. 
They find that increased income risk limits out migration of labour (presumably to 
reduce the risk of family labour shortage), although no effect on schooling decisions is 
found. Also they do not find that the holdings of unproductive, liquid assets are not 
                                                 
10 Note that he finds a significant effect on plot diversification but not on a crop diversification index, 
which may well be linked with some of the points made above.  18 
increased in response to risk, although this could be due to the presence of productive 
liquid assets (such as livestock). 
 
Note that these results do not follow from differences in risk preferences. Controlling 
for preferences, the poor select a low risk-low return portfolio, while the rich take on a 
more risky set of activities. The results are related to the constraints on the options 
available to households. Kochar (1997) states for example in the Indian ICRISAT-
villages “the set of options faced by farmers offers little role for preferences” (p.159). 
See also Morduch (1990), Dercon (1998) or Dercon and Krishnan (1996) for a 
discussion. 
 
•  Several income-based strategies are only invoked when a crisis looms. These 
(income) ‘coping’ or ‘survival’ strategies are especially important when the shock 
is economy-wide. 
 
When a large negative occurs, the usual household activities may not yield sufficient 
income. If all households in a community or region are affected, local income earning 
activities are unlikely to be sufficient. Examples of these crises are drought, floods, 
but also large economic shocks, such as those affected parts of Asia in recent years.  
 
Kochar (1997) argues that labour supply adjustments, rather than asset or other 
strategies, are the main strategy used by households in India to cope with negative 
idiosyncratic shocks. Increased labour force participation in response to economic 
shocks is also found elsewhere.  Moser (1998) reports increased female labour market 
participation and child labour in communities in Ecuador and Zambia (p.8). Jacoby 
and Skoufias (1997) find that in the Indian ICRISAT villages, children are taken out 
of school in response to adverse income shocks to work, resulting in low hum capital 
accumulation. 
 
A lot of attention has been given to these strategies in times of famine, such as those 
affecting the Horn of Africa or the Sahelian countries in the mid-1980s. In some 
cases, the strategies are just an intensification of the ‘usual’ risk-coping strategies; in 
other cases, additional action is taken to prevent destitution
11.  Dessalegn Rahmato 
(1991), Corbett (1988), Davies (1996), De Waal (1987) report many examples, 
including temporary migration for jobs, longer working days, collecting wild foods, 
collecting forest products for sale such as firewood, etc.  As an illustration of the scale 
of involvement in these activities, table 5 gives some details on survival strategies 
used in Ethiopia. It gives the frequency of households using a particular strategy 
during the famine of the mid-1980s in Ethiopia, in six different villages across the 
country. 
                                                 
11A similar intensification of asset-based strategies can be noted during serious crises. While liquid 
assets are used to deal with fluctuations in reasonably bad years, when several bad years have followed, 
one observes more productive assets to be sold. For example, during the Ethiopian famine in the mid-
1980s, households started to sell ploughs and other tools, as well as furniture, utensils and any other 
assets they had (Dessalegn Rahmato (1991)).  19 
Table 5 Coping strategies employed during the worst period of 1984/85 and 
subsequent crisis in 1980s in Ethiopia. Percentage of households reporting 
the use of  particular strategy (n=520). 
  Cutting  wild foods  sold   sold   Feeding  migrated  food aid 
V illage  back food    assets  livestock  Camp  for work   
Dinki  100% 78% 26% 80%  1%  2% 84% 
D  Berhan  52% 2% 8%  93% 1% 1% 0% 
Adele  89% 80% 58%  8% 15%  5% 42% 
Korod  93% 62% 26% 38%  1% 21%  7% 
Gara  Godo  93% 99% 78% 86% 27%  6% 56% 
Domaa  92% 74% 45% 31%  1%  3% 36% 
Own calculations using data from IFPRI-survey, 1989 
 
•  To conclude, diversifying income sources is useful but for the poor it may come at 
a high cost. Observing specialisation does not necessarily imply that the 
household follows a high-risk strategy. Also, entry constraints may limit the 
diversification that can be achieved, leaving only low return activities free to the 
poor. Income portfolios must be seen in relation to the asset portfolio and other 
options available: a risky, specialised portfolio may mean lower consumption risk 
than a diversified portfolio, depending on the asset position. 
 
4.  Informal risk-sharing and safety nets 
 
•  There has been increasing interest in the empirical analysis of informal risk-
sharing and theoretical modelling on the sustainability and consequences of these 
arrangements. 
 
Beyond income-based strategies and self-insurance, households use a variety of 
informal risk-sharing arrangements to cope with the consequences of risk. Typically, 
they involve a system of mutual assistance between family networks or communities. 
In recent years, research into the extent of risk-sharing obtained by these institutions 
has boomed. Some of this literature has had a clear empirical emphasis. Central 
questions addressed have been whether there is any empirical evidence of complete 
risk-sharing both in communities in developing country as in a wide variety of 
settings, including the U.S.
12 and how (partial or complete) risk-sharing is obtained. 
The tests have generally found that complete risk-sharing has to be rejected, including 
in the U.S., in communities in India, in extended families in the PSID or even within 
nuclear households in Ethiopia (Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), Townsend (1994), 
Hayashi et al. (1996), Dercon and Krishnan (1999)).  
 
These studies tend to test the presence of outcomes similar to those obtained by risk-
sharing, although it cannot distinguish results due to self-insurance (i.e. accumulating 
and depleting assets) and informal insurance (or insurance-like behaviour, via 
transfers or credit). Nevertheless, there is evidence of partial risk-sharing via transfer 
behaviour in different countries or state-contingent (‘quasi’)-credit. Udry (1994) 
present evidence on state-contingent loans in Northern Nigeria. Lund and Fafchamps 
                                                 
12 Note that this is the question that macroeconomists would love to see us prove: indeed, complete risk-
sharing via formal and informal mechanisms would provide one of the few possible justifications to 
work with representative consumer models in macroeconomics…   20 
(1997) show that loans and transfers play a role in risk-sharing. Grimard (1992) 
ordered the LSMS Côte d’Ivoire data by tribe and appears to find more stable 
consumption by tribes than for the full data set, suggesting that tribal networks allow 
smoothing over space, including via transfers. Full risk-sharing is rejected, however. 
Rosenzweig (1988) finds that poor households marry daughters deliberately out over 
space. Since covariance in income risk is likely to decline with distance, remittance 
flows between areas in found to contribute to smoother consumption, when either 
experiences a negative shock. Other evidence on the role of transfer is coping with 
shocks is in Ravallion and Dearden (1988) and Lucas and Stark (1985). 
 
The theoretical literature has focused on the role of information on the possibilities for 
and consequences of risk-sharing arrangements (Hoff (1996)) and especially on the 
nature and sustainability of (partial or complete) risk-sharing arrangements given the 
lack of formal enforcement (Coate and Ravallion, Thomas and Worrall (1994), 
Platteau (1997), Ligon et al. (1997), Attanasio et Rios-Rull (1999)). Ligon et al. 
(1997) shows evidence that the constrained risk-sharing model fits the ICRISAT-data 
for India better. 
 
•  Risk-sharing can be viewed as the cross-sectional equivalent of consumption 
smoothing over time. 
 
The key prediction of the full risk-sharing model is that marginal utilities across 
individuals in a risk-sharing group move in lock-step. This is obviously similar to the 
prediction of a permanent income/life-cycle model without liquidity constraints (as 
above), where marginal utilities over time for an individual are equated, conditional 
on appropriate discounting. The existence of full risk-sharing implies that all group 
resources are effectively pooled, although the theory is agnostic about the who gets 
what share of the joint resources. Risk-sharing implies that any unpredicted event is 
covered by a state-contingent transfer from other members in the group. From this it 
should be obvious that the group can insure idiosyncratic shocks, not common shocks. 
It would then be tempting to suggest that other means should be used to insure 
common shocks - savings or public safety nets should be developed to cope with these 
risks. However, the consequences of these alternatives should be well understood.  
 
•  In the absence of enforcement problems, the existence of better savings 
opportunities and a public safety net providing transfer when common shocks 
occur, could improve welfare without crowding out the informal insurance 
arrangement. A transfer-based safety net is, however, likely to crowd out private 
(precautionary) savings. 
 
Suppose that full risk-sharing is always feasible for the group. The easiest assumption 
to justify this, is that besides full information, strong social norms exist that punish 
deviations, so that it is never better to renege on the agreement to share risks
13. If 
saving is possible, then households would have incentives to build up assets to cope 
with hardship. However, if they know that they are locked into a risk-sharing 
arrangement, then assets will only be built up to cope with common shocks, since the 
                                                 
13 This is obviously not satisfactory as an assumption, and will be relaxed below. For the time being, it 
provides a useful way to develop the arguments.  21 
risk-sharing agreement would continue to handle idiosyncratic shocks. Effectively, 
this would be equivalent to building up assets at the group level for self-insurance of 
the group to cope with common shocks.  The corollary, the implications for savings 
when a group enters into a risk-sharing agreement, would be to reduce precautionary 
savings, since idiosyncratic shocks could now be insured via other means.  
 
The introduction of a public safety net based on transfer and activated when a 
common shock occurs, has similar effects. If it only deals with common shocks, then 
the risk-sharing arrangement would not be crowded-out, but function for idiosyncratic 
shocks. If savings are possible, then the introduction of a public safety net would 
reduce precautionary savings, since overall risk has been reduced, which by definition 
means lower precautionary savings (Deaton (1991)). Private savings would be 
‘crowded-out’. These savings are generally kept in liquid form and are not very 
suitable as basis for credit multiplication. However, if one worries about this 
crowding-out effect, then improving savings opportunities may be superior in some 
circumstances to a transfer-based public safety net.  
 
Finally, if a public safety net is also available for dealing with idiosyncratic shocks, 
then some displacement of the informal insurance system is likely, especially if the 




•  Informal insurance arrangements are likely to have to be self-enforcing, imposing 
sustainability constraints. Circumstances in which risk-sharing arrangements may 
be sustained are, inter alia: a low discount rate of the future, high frequency of 
interactions, situations in which idiosyncratic shocks are more frequent relative to 
other shocks. 
 
Enforcement through norms alone is unlikely to be sufficient. In recent years, formal 
models of informal insurance arrangements have clarified the conditions in which 
agreements could be sustained (Coate and Ravallion (1993), Thomas and Worrall 
(1994), Ligon et al. (1997)
15).  The models rely on specifying an enforceability (or 
sustainability) constraint in each state, in which individuals must find it in their 
interest to remain in the scheme, rather than going it alone. Punishment for reneging 
on the agreement is exclusion from the scheme in the future. These models 
systematically find that risk-sharing arrangements can be sustained if individuals 
discount future returns at a low rate, so that any future benefits matter in deciding to 
enter or to remain in the scheme. Also, they rely on a large number of shocks and 
interactions; idiosyncratic shocks can be insured, or in general, shocks in which a 
large number of members are not affected by a shock relative to the number of 
members affected.  
 
                                                 
14 Cox and Jimenez (1991) find that in Peru, formal social security payments reduced private transfers 
from the young to the old by 20 percent.  
15 For a discussion of the differences in some of the models, see Platteau (1997)). In Ravallion and 
Coate (1993) the state-contingent transfers are fixed; in Thomas and Worrall (1994), an updating rule 
for risk-sharing is obtained, which changes according to changes in the participation constraint over 
time.  22 
•  Evaluating the effects of alternative coping mechanisms such as savings, or policy 
interventions such as providing better savings instruments or public safety nets 
needs to take into account their effect on incentives to sustain the agreement 
rather than to go it alone.  It is possible that opportunities for precautionary 
savings or a public safety net would actually be welfare-reducing and displace the 
informal insurance arrangement by more than one to one. 
 
The standard models do not allow for self-insurance. Introducing the possibility of 
savings in the model provides better insurance to individuals to cope with common 
shocks. However, it will also affect the outcome when leaving the arrangement, since 
self-insurance can reduce the consequences of both idiosyncratic and common shocks 
(and as was shown in section 2, rather substantial insurance could be obtained in this 
way). Ligon et al. (1998) have shown that it may then not be optimal to sustain the 
agreement and the risk-sharing arrangement may break down. Indeed, it can be shown 
that fewer agreements would be sustained. Unless the welfare effect of having access 
to savings increases beyond the loss from the breakdown of the arrangement, welfare 
would be lower after the introduction of savings. Self-insurance via private savings 
could crowd out the informal insurance scheme by more than one-to-one, i.e. more is 
lost than gained. 
 
This principle of the possible ambiguous consequences of alternative insurance 
opportunities on the informal insurance arrangements and on welfare is more general, 
if the alternatives result in improving an individual’s outcome when reneging on the 
agreement, i.e. the enforceability constraints are affected. In that case, more than one-
to-one crowding out of the informal arrangement could occur and overall welfare 
could be reduced (although this is not necessarily so). In particular, Attanasio and 
Rios-Rull (1999) consider the consequences of introducing a safety net to deal with 
common shocks. Since the insurance of some part of the total risk faced by 
households improves the households’ autarky position, it is possible that more than 
one-to-one crowding out occurs and total welfare is reduced by the safety net.  
 
•  Any policy intervention that improves an individual’s position outside a private 
group-based informal risk-sharing arrangement may provide incentives to break 
down the informal arrangement. Targeted interventions that target only some 
members of communities or groups could be particularly counterproductive.  
 
Policy interventions, such as a public safety net, are presented with a dilemma. If 
informal arrangements are present, then any outside intervention that provides an 
alternative source of insurance may displace the existing informal arrangements. The 
reason is again that the individual’s outside option – part of the enforceability 
constraint – is likely to be affected.  
 
Currently, many safety net interventions are targeted: particular groups, e.g. women or 
landless workers tend to be targeted by schemes. Public works employment schemes 
are set up for able-bodied people; direct transfers target to the ill and infirm, etc. 
Targeted interventions has become part of the standard safety net package supported 
by international donors, including e.g. in the current crisis in Indonesia or in the 
recurrent local famine situations in parts of Africa. Note that they may affect current 
informal systems since they affect the enforceability constraint by changing the  23 
outside options available to members. If one is concerned about sustaining informal 




To avoid these problems, schemes that target groups rather than individuals, e.g. 
employment schemes for the group or the whole community involved in an informal 
scheme may be more appropriate. This of course requires detailed information about 
the informal schemes operating (Attanasio and Rios-Rull (1999)). If the scheme only 
deals with common and not idiosyncratic shocks, none of the crowding-out or welfare 
effects should apply. Of course, this presents substantial design and information 
problems. 
 
•  Group-based savings schemes could provide a useful alternative or complement if 
one is concerned about crowding-out. The possibly negative welfare effects can be 
avoided. 
 
An alternative could be to encourage and support groups involved in informal 
insurance arrangements to develop group-based self-insurance mechanisms. Indeed, 
the standard distinction that individual-based self-insurance can deal best with 
common shocks, while informal arrangements are suitable for idiosyncratic shocks, is 
misleading. Groups have incentives to self-insure as well, especially if there are 
economies of scale in asset holdings (e.g. transactions costs, opportunities for risk-
pooling of assets, etc.). Groups could build up assets in good years, to deplete in bad 
years for the benefit of its members, using transfer rules and mechanisms parallel to 
the risk-sharing arrangement for idiosyncratic shocks
17. 
 
If individuals can only benefit from the savings when part of the group, then the 
negative incentive effects working via the enforceability constraints of the agreement, 
would not exist. Groups could then extend their brief to deal to the extent possible, 
with common shocks as well.  
 
Policy interventions could provide incentives for this type of behaviour. Better savings 
instruments, access to banking, but also macroeconomic stability would assist this 
process. One could also endeavour to include a more important savings-for-insurance 
element in group-based credit programmes, a current favourite in donor interventions.  
 
•  Whether the crowding-out and potential negative welfare effects of interventions 
on informal insurance mechanisms are significant is an empirical question. If 
common shocks are dominant and if groups and communities rather than just 
individuals are targeted, these negative effects are likely to be less significant. 
 
Ultimately, more empirical research should shed light on the very groups and 
institutions engaging in informal arrangements, their functioning and role and their 
                                                 
16 Note that self-targeted schemes may not necessarily solve the problem: they also affect the 
individuals’ outside option. Of course, the lower the payments in the scheme, the less they will affect 
the enforceability constraints. This is simply equivalent to providing lower insurance. 
17 Indeed, in some traditional societies, this type of group behaviour was common. An example could be 
found in Western Tanzania (Sukumaland), where a community food stock, run by the village head, 
provided protection for the village when a large-scale crisis occurred.  24 
potential for expansion. Also, we need more work on whether and how these informal 
arrangements are affected by interventions and whether alternative schemes can be 
designed.  It is likely that interventions should especially be cautious in contexts 
conducive to these private informal institutions, such as tightly-knit groups affected by 
substantial idiosyncratic shocks. In a context where common shocks are dominant and 
if groups or communities can be targeted, then interventions are more likely to be 




5. Monitoring income risk, vulnerability and coping strategies 
 
 
•  Standard quantitative poverty analysis assumes that consumption is smooth. If 
smoothing is not possible, especially when large negative shocks occur, then 
alternative measures of poverty and vulnerability need to be explored. 
 
Income as a measure of welfare to identify poverty has long been recognised to be 
problematic. As an alternative, current consumption, as found in cross-section 
surveys, has been used for most quantitative poverty analysis. The argument is that 
consumption is smoother than income and due to concavity of utility (risk-aversion), 
households have strong incentives to keep consumption smooth. However, the 
combination of high income risk and the observed inability of households to keep 
consumption smooth via risk-management or coping strategies, especially when a 
serious shock hits them, would suggest that alternative measures are needed
19.  
 
•  If inter-temporal data are available, broader definitions can be used to describe 
vulnerability. Aggregate measures of ‘vulnerability’ can be obtained. 
 
If data are available on consumption over time, it is possible to take into account that 
some households may only be poor in some years. For example, one could distinguish 
those that are poor in each period from those that are poor in only some of the periods 
sampled. In all panel data sets on developing countries currently available, the large 
consumption fluctuations in the data result in a large number of the households 
moving in and out of poverty. For example, in the Indian ICRISAT data set, about 25 
                                                 
18There is some evidence that these issues may be relevant in Ethiopia. While generally the success of 
NGO programmes is rather limited in parts of the country, one NGO particularly targeted traditional 
funeral societies as the basis for their interventions, providing assistance and credit to members, using 
rules parallel to those of the funeral society, apparently rather succesfully. Communities and groups 
may also be concerned that safety nets affect their community in a negative way. In Ethiopia, due to 
practical reasons, community councils were instructed to select workers among the poorest for many 
public works employment generation programmes. Apparently, targeting was in the end limited – the 
communities allowed virtually everybody to participate on a rotational basis. While other reasons are 
bound to be relevant as well, it would be consistent with attempting not to break down other risk-
sharing arrangements. 
19 Alternatives to consumption as a welfare indicator suffer from the same problems, despite apparent 
suggestions to the contrary. Alternative measures, such as nutrition, food expenditure, expenditure on 
specific commodities (such as health or education), and even measures such as health or enrolment into 
schools would suffer from the same problems. See the evidence on education and nutrition quoted 
above (Jalan and Ravallion (1998), Jacoby and Skoufias (1998), Dercon and Krishnan (1999), Foster 
(1995)).  25 
percent of the poor in each period move out of poverty in the next period. Gaiha and 
Deolalikar (1998) reported that only 12 percent of households were never poor. Jalan 
and Ravallion (1996) reported that about half the poor in each year were not poor on 
average in their sample form Rural China.  Using data from rural Ethiopia, Dercon 
and Krishnan (1999b) report that while poverty remains largely the same on average 
between 1994 and 1995 at about 40 percent, about a third of the poor are different 
households in each year.  In all these data sets, the longer the time period considered, 
the fewer the households that appear to be always poor
20. 
 
One could define ‘vulnerable households’ as those liable to fall under the poverty line 
over time, even though they need not be always poor. The evidence from panel data 
sets would suggest that a far higher percentage of people is vulnerable than observed 
to be poor in a particular year.   
 
Another way to approach the problem is due to Ravallion (1988). He has proposed a 
means to capture the distinction between chronic and transient poverty. Using 
consumption as the underlying welfare measure, the chronically poor are those with 
average consumption below the poverty line. Transient poverty for an individual is the 
average poverty over time of this individual minus chronic poverty. Formally, for the 
case of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures, chronic poverty Pα
c can be 
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These definitions mean that poverty can be decomposed into a transient and chronic 
part. For example, using the squared poverty gap, Ravallion and Jalan (1996) report 
that roughly half of total (inter-temporally aggregate) poverty in their Chinese rural 
panel data set covering 1985-90 is contributed by transient poverty.  They find that 
transient poverty is highest for those with average consumption near the poverty line 
and about 40 percent of transient poverty is found among those not poor on average. 
But almost all transient poverty is for households whose mean consumption is no 
more than 50 percent above the poverty line. Again, this means that in any given year, 
the poor will exclude some that are at risk to be poor in the near future
21. Some of the 
                                                 
20 One needs to be cautious when interpreting the evidence on widespread poverty transitions and 
fluctuations. Measurement error in the data would show up as increased movement up and down the 
poverty line, increasing the apparent mobility. Still, since most studies can find variables correlated 
with the fluctuations which are unlikely to be correlated measurement error in consumption, it is likely 
that a substantial part of the observed consumption fluctuations are genuine. See for example Deolalikar 
and Gaiha (1993), Baulch and McCulloch (1998), Dercon and Krishnan (1999). 
21 Or, to put it more correctly, given that Ravallion and Jalan (1996) use the squared poverty gap (P2), 
the non-poor in any given year will contribute to poverty in other years.  26 
non-poor tend to have relatively high average consumption over time (but within 
bounds).  
 
One could argue that those who are not chronically poor, i.e. who have average 
consumption levels above mean consumption, are not or less ‘deserving’ attention. 
However, if these outcomes in particular periods cannot be avoided, i.e. they cannot 
smooth consumption, due to constraints on their risk-management and risk-coping 
strategies, then this position is hard to maintain. The empirical discussion has to focus 
on whether this transient poverty is due to preferences (‘poor’ choices) or constraints 
on their choices. The available evidence discussed above may well lead us to consider 
that their choices are indeed often constrained.  
  
In looking at poverty transitions in the currently available data sets, one may be 
tempted to interpret these fluctuations as closely linked to risk and shocks. The 
decomposition of poverty into transient and chronic poverty similarly suggests that 
transient poverty is linked to risk. However, this links needs to be established. Paxson 
(1992) links shocks in rainfall directly to income and consumption fluctuations. She 
finds that part of the fluctuations are unlikely to be linked to constrained responses 
towards shocks.  
 
Dercon and Krishnan (1999) look explicitly at the link between shocks and poverty 
transitions, using panel data from Ethiopia. They use a fixed-effects model of 
consumption in which changes in consumption are linked to idiosyncratic and 
common shocks, such as rainfall shocks, a series of other crop shocks, illness shocks, 
shocks to livestock, etc. They find some of the fluctuations appear to be seasonal 
responses to prices and labour requirements. Nevertheless, shocks matter. Most areas 
in the sample experienced a fairly good harvest in the sample period. In the best 
period of the year (the post-harvest period) they find actual poverty of about 33 
percent; in the worst period about 40 percent. Using the model and the shock 
information, they find however that depending on how good the year is, poverty in the 
post-harvest period could be up to 56 percent in the post-harvest period to 60 percent 
in the worst period.  In other words, given current coping opportunities, a large 
percentage of the population would be vulnerable in a bad year, substantially larger 
than current poverty estimates from the (relatively good) 1990s would suggest. The 
figure of 60 percent may then be considered a good estimate of the ‘population at risk’ 
in the sample area. 
 
All this points to the limitations of current ‘static’ poverty measures. Measures of 
vulnerability, ‘population at risk’, have a useful policy content, as have measures that 
distinguish chronic from transient poverty. The former could help the policy debate on 
whether poverty is increasing or not – any poverty estimates at different points in time 
will reflect the current circumstances, including the effects due to shocks. It is 
perfectly possible for poverty figures to be higher in one year relative to the next, but 
the vulnerable population may have gone down. Economic policy measures may 
increase opportunities to handle risk, e.g. via better access to or better functioning 
asset markets and reduce vulnerability. At the same time, a terms of trade shock may 
have increased the actual number of poor. While the net effect may have been a 
poverty increase, in fact, vulnerability may have decreased.  
  27 
Information on the scale of chronic poverty relative to transient poverty could inform 
policy makers on the balance between mean-income increasing economic measures 
(‘growth’) relative to opportunities to mitigate fluctuations in income and 
consumption – such as safety nets, credit and insurance markets, etc.  The size of 
transient poverty is a also a significant constraint on the scope for reaching the 
chronically poor using targeted anti-poverty policies contingent on current levels of 
poverty (Jalan and Ravallion (1996)). 
 
•  Targeting assistance to the vulnerable population requires specific kinds of 
information. Analysing the characteristics of households experiencing chronic or 
transient poverty, or in general, their consumption fluctuations, can provide this 
information. Panel data are required here. 
 
Ravallion and Jalan (1996) investigated the determinants of transient and chronic 
poverty in rural China in a (reduced-form) non-parametric regression using household 
characteristics as explanatory variables.  They find that they are determined by 
different models, although some variables are significant in both regressions. Both are 
determined by variables such as certain physical assets (including land per capita and 
wealth) and household characteristics, including literacy of the head and household 
size.  
 
Glewwe and Hall (1998) considered vulnerable households as those experiencing 
large declines in consumption following economic shocks during the adjustment 
between 1985 and 1990 in Peru. In this period, GNP per capita fell by 30 percent They 
find that households with poorly educated heads and with more children are more 
affected by the shock. Contrary to what is usually stated, they found that female-
headed households were not more vulnerable than male headed households.    
 
Both approaches give information on the characteristics of the vulnerable. They do not 
give information on why they may fail to keep consumption smooth when shocks hit 
them. Nor give they direct information on how others manage to avoid consumption 
declines
22. Still, the data requirements for this analysis are high – panel data on 
welfare outcomes – to obtain some understanding of the type of households at risk or 
chronically poor. However, once the analysis is done, identification could be done on 
the basis of relatively easily observable characteristics (e.g. certain assets and 
household characteristics).  
 
•  If policies are exogenous to the risk management and coping strategies, then 
information on how households handle income risk is irrelevant. However, 
policies may affect household opportunities to cope with risk (e.g. by changing 
exit options from informal insurance). In that case, how households cope with risk 
is relevant for the design of policies, in turn increasing data requirements. 
 
In most applied poverty policy analysis, most attention goes towards identifying the 
poor and then promoting targeted interventions, such as safety nets via public 
                                                 
22 Glewwe and Hall (1998) do some analysis on this. They find that those receiving transfers from 
abroad (and contrary to those relying on transfers from within the country) managed to avoid 
consumption declines.  28 
employment schemes. Self-targeting mechanisms are then considered a way of 
reaching the poor in a cost-effective way. However, once we are acknowledging that 
the poor may well engage in alternative coping mechanisms, then more care will be 
needed in designing policies.  
 
In general, policies such as providing safety nets and or changes to economic policy 
will affect household opportunity sets. A new safety net may well affect household 
actions, such as reducing self-insurance (see above) as well as increasing overall risk 
in the income activities portfolio. However, while the ‘traditional’ activities may be 
affected negatively, overall households have more livelihood security, so this can 
hardly be looked upon as a welfare loss. 
 
Of course, other economic policies may well have negative effects on risk 
management strategies, for example through general equilibrium effects. One can 
imagine trade liberalisation resulting in cheaper imports of clothes and utensils, 
reducing demand for weaving and handicraft, both relatively low entry cost activities, 
used to reduce income risk.  
 
For our purposes, the negative externalities of otherwise ‘positive’ policies are very 
important. As was discussed before, a safety net may provide more protection for an 
individual, but if this person is linked via informal insurance with other persons not 
benefiting from the safety net, then a problem may arise.  The informal agreement 
may become unsustainable, leaving some individuals worse off, despite the safety net.  
 
A targeted safety net may cause these problems. Optimal policy design would then 
require not just information on those currently most at risk, but also use insights on 
the informal links and insurance between the targeted group and other possibly 
vulnerable groups dependent on informal arrangements. In general, if policies cannot 
be assumed to be exogenous to household behaviour and networks, then more detailed 
analysis on the shocks experienced by households and the way households cope with 
income risk would be needed to inform policy. At present, very little analysis is 
available. 
 
•  If effective safety nets and other consumption risk-reducing policies require 
detailed knowledge of existing risk-reducing actions by households, then surveys 
need information on physical, human and social capital, on shocks, as well as on 
opportunities in labour, product and asset markets. Panel and cross-section 
surveys could be used to collect relevant information. 
 
The analysis of the success and failings of existing risk-reducing strategies by 
household is highly data-intensive. Most analysis published in the economics 
literature on risk and its consequences in developing countries is based on a handful of 
data sets, with most stylised facts entering into textbook development economics 
based on the three villages in South India, covered by ICRISAT.  It is not realistic to 
expect this detail for a large number of countries in the developing world.   
 
While more work is no doubt needed on detailed panel data sets, household surveys, 
including cross-sections, could be used to derive some measures and insights to 
establish vulnerability and the strategies used by households. In particular, most  29 
studies find that vulnerability to shocks is closely linked to assets in the form of   
human capital and physical capital. In many ways, these are similar factors as typically 
highlighted as determining long-term poverty
23. Households with limited land 
holdings, with few assets that can be liquidated and with limited education, typically 
are most affected by the consequences of income risk. This is reflected in a lower 
mean level of consumption (due to consumption risk averting actions, such as income 
skewing) or higher consumption fluctuations. Most cross-section household surveys 
contain information on physical and human capital, although in recent years, some of 
the instruments promoted for monitoring welfare changes appear to have been cutting 
back on these measures
24. Information on human and physical capital may be 
contributing to insights on access to income-based strategies and self-insurance (or 
access to credit markets). 
 
Information on physical and human capital may not be enough. In the discussion in 
section 3, it was argued that households may face constraints to enter into profitable 
diversification. Existing research suggests that physical and human capital are crucial 
determinants for entry into these activities. However, at the same time opportunities 
must exist to exploit these activities. Well-functioning markets, helped by 
infrastructure, roads and a demand for these products are just as important; general 
economic policies matter as well. It may well be possible that physical capital or skills 
are available, for example to enter into handicrafts or trade, as part of a coping 
strategy, but some areas may just be too remote to enter into them profitably. In short, 
information on opportunities available is just as important
25. 
 
Note that entry constraints and incentives to skew income towards low-risk activities 
imply that indexes measuring the degree of diversification (e.g. the number of 
activities, the share of off-farm income, etc.) are unlikely to be a good measure of 
vulnerability. As was argued before, diversification is a useful strategy, but it may 
well be that a diversified portfolio is held for other reasons than risk-reduction. There 
is also no reason why a household specialised in a low risk activity faces higher risk 
than a household having a diversified portfolio of two very risky, correlated activities. 
Furthermore, it is important to look at the income portfolio in conjunction with the 
other risk-coping strategies: assets for self-insurance and informal insurance. Indeed, 
one important lesson from the literature surveyed is that the degree of diversification 
will be endogenous to the other strategies used, including self-insurance, irrespective 
of constraints on diversification. 
 
Physical asset information is bound to be very useful to describe vulnerability. Studies 
that find the lack of consumption smoothing over time usually conclude that 
households with relatively low asset holdings are more at risk. The total value of 
                                                 
23 Note however, the remark from Jalan and Ravallion (1996) that the model determining the link 
between assets and transient versus chronic poverty appears different. 
24 For example, in some countries, the SDA Priority Surveys and the Quick surveys appear to have less 
and less asset information in the data, with an increased focus on monitoring consumption only. 
25 A good example are the ‘traditional’ coping mechanisms with a localised drought in Ethiopia. During 
the drought in Northern Ethiopia in 1984-85, households could not fall back on one of their typical 
strategies, temporary migration to look for work, because there was a ban on casual wage labour 
imposed by the government, while the war effort made anyone travelling suspect. The consequences are 
well-known.   30 
assets alone may not provide sufficient information on the ability to self-insurance.  
Important questions also relate to the liquidity of assets – can they be sold if needed? 
Note that many assets held in developing countries are liquid: crop inventories, cash, 
but also livestock, jewellery, etc, even though the latter examples may have a cost in 
lumpiness. As the discussion in section 2 showed, information on the functioning of 
asset markets is necessary to determine the usefulness of the assets.  
 
In short, data on physical and human capital, combined with information on the 
functioning of and opportunities in product, labour and asset markets could provide a 
good basis to identify vulnerable households. Standard household surveys, including 
cross-section surveys, may contain a substantial part of the relevant information at the 
household level.  
 
Note that consumption poverty measured in a cross-section is likely to be correlated 
with these asset holdings. But as was argued above is unlikely to identify the 
vulnerable households correctly. Once vulnerability to consumption shortfalls is the 
focal point, broader asset-based concepts of poverty data are needed to evaluate 
policies and progress. Static poverty assessments and, in general, the discussion of 
dynamic welfare change based on two or more static measures of poverty, derived 
from cross-sections, are bound to give only a limited insight in the actual patterns of 
change.  
 
Data collection on household involvement in informal insurance systems is also 
necessary to describe household vulnerability. The lack of such information is an 
important shortcoming of most standard household surveys. Nevertheless, 
understanding vulnerability and designing interventions to address these problems 
require information on the networks households can fall back onto. It is possible to 
include in household surveys questions about the association of the household with 
others, and whether any insurance element is included. Observed transfers and other 
linkages may be one option; direct questioning on opportunities available to ask for 
help in times of crisis is another. A simple enumeration of the presence of networks 
may be useful, but care has to be taken to interpret any linkage or network as a proof 
for the existence of informal insurance mechanisms. Insurance and support networks 
definitely form part of social capital, but all social capital cannot simply be reduced to 
have insurance purposes.  
 
Finally, a full description of the opportunities available to households to cope with 
shocks requires also information on the available formal safety nets. Any formal 
safety nets, for example as part of a social security policy, is relevant and needs to be 
taken into account for monitoring vulnerability or designing policy initiatives. The 
existence of public employment schemes and the way they function need to be taken 
into account.     
 
The study of different forms of capital and the opportunities available to use them to 
reduce consumption risk can be enhanced by relatively simple, but revealing evidence 
on the experience of households during shocks, whether idiosyncratic or common. In 
particular, it is useful to ask households shocks they have experienced in recent years 
and how they handled these crises. This would include questions on whether they have 
adjusted their income generating activities, how they have used their assets and  31 
whether they could rely on other people to support them during the crisis. Similarly, 
one could investigate how households would respond if particular shocks hit them 
now. While qualitative in nature, these direct questions, combined with information 
on assets could provide rich information on existing strategies to cope with risk and 
could inform appropriate policy design. Townsend (1996) reports on the results of a 
relatively simple questionnaire in used in some villages in Thailand. The focus of the 
questionnaire was on the difference between good and bad years and on whether or 
how households might have managed to smooth consumption
26.  
 
•  The complexity of consumption-risk reducing strategies implies that a simple 
indicator is unlikely to be available. Measures of vulnerability would typically 
require detailed data, including from panels. Some indicators that aim to describe 
vulnerability are typically flawed.   
 
Cross-section surveys could provide useful information on relevant questions related 
to the understanding household vulnerability and its scale. These questions include: 
Do households have assets to sell? Do they have assets to reallocate? Do they have 
labour to reallocate? What opportunities for reallocation labour and assets exist? Can 
they fall back on anyone?
27 If panel data are available for some years, it would be 
possible to derive aggregate measures of ‘population at risk’, in the way discussed 
before. Cross-section data alone are not sufficient for such measures. 
 
Some international agencies have developed measures that aim to describe 
‘population at risk’ using food security information. For example, the FAO uses a 
‘Aggregate Household Food Security Index’, based on per capita dietary energy 
supply (DES) from food balance sheets (and its deviation to long-term average), per 
capita GNP in PPP and the coefficient of variation of the income distribution. For 
reliable statements, the data requirements are very high and clearly not met in this 
case. An estimate of ‘population at risk’ is derived by assuming a time-invariant log-
normal distribution around mean DES. Information gaps and the total lack of 
information on household behaviour and constraints make it quite unreliable for any 
policy purpose. Similarly, USAID has a ‘Food Security Index’ combining five 
indicators: food production per capita, foreign exchange earnings (as a measure of 
import capacity), GNP per capita, child mortality (as a proxy for income distribution) 
and daily calorie supply (as a proxy for food prices). One purpose is to rank countries 
using this index. But again, problems with the data and the lack of information on 
                                                 
26 He finds that some rich households in one village try to smooth using buffer stocks, and some 
relatively poor households increased labour supply. Another group borrow and lend from each other 
and have developed village institutions, such as a rice bank, a housewife fund and a health insurance 
fund. He also finds that in a relatively rich village integrated in the cash economy, these village level 
institutions do not function and severe illness appears to result in serious shocks to consumption, 
suggesting the type of disincentive effects for sustainable informal arrangements when outside options 
change, as were discussed before. 
27 The emphasis in this paper has been on the household as the main unit engaging in strategies to 
reduce consumption risk. The analysis does not need to stop here: if resources are allocated as part of 
bargaining between members of the household, individual strategies could also described and 
discussed. Similarly, in data collection, one could collect data on individual strategies, access to capital 
and opportunities. Detailed analysis of this goes beyond the scope of this paper. Few empirical studies 
have successfully addressed these issues as well.  32 
household opportunities limit its use (see Devereux (1998) for a discussion of these 
and other food security monitoring activities). 
 
•  The emphasis on the ability to cope with risk via assets, human capital and 
informal insurance and on the opportunities available, marks a convergence of 
different disciplines, bridging gaps with more qualitative approaches. 
 
The increasing emphasis on monitoring different forms of capital (human, physical 
and social) and the opportunities to use these capital goods when needed clearly draws 
inspiration from Sen’s ‘entitlements’ approach to the analysis of famine. Although we 
emphasise that household surveys can derive much of the relevant information to 
monitor and understand vulnerability to risk, similar approaches can be found in 
social-sciences literature using qualitative approaches. An example is Moser’s ‘Asset 
Vulnerability Framework’ in which households’ access to different types of assets 
determines vulnerability (Moser (1998) and the reference therein). Similarly to the 
approach taken in this paper, households are considered managers of complex 
portfolios of assets and interventions should be aimed to promote better opportunities 
to use these assets. This approach relies on more qualitative data collection 
techniques, such participatory assessment. 
 
Some may be tempted to suggest that quantitative surveys should not be used to study 
vulnerability and risk-coping strategies, and leave qualitative studies fill the gap (as 
appears to be case at present in welfare monitoring activities). We do not take this 
position. Integrating qualitative data collection into quantitative household surveys is 
bound to yield less contradictory evidence than presently seems to be found by the 
different approaches, for example on the effects on vulnerability and poverty from 
economic policies. National household surveys are likely to be required to obtain 
information on the scale of vulnerability and its regional spread and diversity, and to 
inform decisions about policies and priorities. The local nature of qualitative studies is 
bound to add more detailed understanding of vulnerability, but the results are difficult 





Households in developing countries continue to face considerable risk, threatening 
their livelihood. In this paper, we have discussed the different strategies households 
use to cope with this risk. We have focused on income-based strategies, on assets as 
self-insurance and on informal insurance arrangements. Households are constrained in 
using these strategies. Income-based strategies are limited because of entry-constraints 
into profitable activities, leaving the poor to concentrate on low return, low risk 
activities. Self-insurance is limited by access to assets and poor functioning of asset 
markets when a crisis hits the household. Informal insurance arrangements are 
affected by sustainability constraints, often excluding the  poor  from these 
arrangements; furthermore, economy-wide shocks cannot be handled by these 
arrangements. 
 
Economic policies could contribute to better protection against risk. Improved 
working of asset markets and macroeconomic stability would contribute to the  33 
usefulness of self-insurance. Increased access to alternative economic activities and 
increased opportunities could allow income-based strategies to be strengthened. 
Public safety nets might be thought to provide a useful alternative; however they are 
likely to result in some crowding out and even a decline in average welfare, since 
incentive effects could affect the sustainability of informal insurance arrangements. 
Initiatives to develop safety nets should take into account existing risk-coping 
strategies. Issues of the net welfare effects and crowding-out are relevant. 
Strengthening self-insurance may remain an insufficiently explored alternative, such 
as via group-based savings  More empirical research, however, if necessary to assess 




Obtaining estimates on the vulnerable population rather than the currently poor is very 
data intensive, requiring panel data. Measures of transient and chronic poverty could 
provide useful descriptions for policy analysis. Cross-section surveys could also 
provide useful insights. In particular, they could provide information on the 
underlying determinants of the risk-reducing strategies, in the form of physical, human 
and social capital. They also could inform about the opportunities available to 
households, currently and during past crises. Qualitative studies could provide useful 
insights but incorporating some of these concerns in large quantitative household 
surveys is likely to yield important pay-offs in terms of better understanding of 
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